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International Art and Cultural Heritage
DAVID BRIGHT, JACQUELINE FARINELLA, PATTY GERSTENBLITH, AND LAINA LoPEz*
In 2011, many of the significant legal developments in the cultural heritage field con-
cerned either interpretations of questions of foreign sovereign immunity or doctrines im-
plicating relations between nations. These cases arose in the context of recovery of art
works and other cultural materials that had been expropriated sometime in the past, par-
ticularly during the Holocaust. While new ratifications of international conventions con-
cerning cultural heritage proceeded at a slower pace, keen interest continued in the
bilateral agreements concluded between the United States and other nations under the
1970 United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer of Ownership or Cultural Property.
I. International Conventions and Agreements
A. NEW STATES PARTIES
Oman was the only new State Party to join the Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague
Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict this
year.' Four nations-Namibia, Morocco, Benin, and Jamaica-ratified the 2001
UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, bringing
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1. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict, Mar. 26, 1999, 2253 U.N.T.S. 212. List of State Parties may be obtained at
UNESCO's website. Conventions, http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=15207&language=E (last
visited Jan. 19, 2012).
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the number of States Parties to forty.2 Sweden and Denmark ratified the 1995 Unidroit
Convention on Stolen and Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, bringing to thirty-two the
number of States Parties.3
B. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1970 UNESCO CONVENTION
Pursuant to the Cultural Property Transfer Act, Switzerland's implementing legislation
for the 1970 UNESCO Convention, Switzerland has concluded bilateral agreements with
several nations to restrict the import of illegally exported cultural objects.4 Three of these
agreements-with Egypt, Greece, and Colombia-went into effect this past year.5
Acting under its implemented legislation-the Convention on Cultural Property Im-
plementation Act (CPIA)6-the United States extended its bilateral agreements (Memo-
randa of Understanding) with Colombia,7 Italy8 and Bolivia9 for additional five-year
periods and concluded a new agreement with the Hellenic Republic.10 These agreements,
which restrict the importation of archaeological and ethnographic materials into the
United States, are in effect for five years and may be extended in five-year increments.
The Committee has also now begun considering two new requests from Belize and from
Bulgaria."
2. Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, Nov. 2, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 40 (2002).
List of State Parties may be obtained at UNESCO's website, supra note 1.
3. Unidroit Convention on Stolen and Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 24, 1995, Unidroit Con-
ventions, http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/1995culturalproperty/1995culturalproperty-e.pdf.
List of States Parties may be obtained at Unidroit's website. Status of UNIDRorr Conventions, http://
www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-95.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2012).
4. See BilateralAgreements, BuNDESAMT FOR KULTUR [FEDERAL OFFICE OF CULTURE], http://www.bak.
admin.ch/themen/klturguetertransfer/01985/index.html?lang=en (last visited Jan. 19, 2012).
5. See id.
6. Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-13 (2010).
7. See Colombia, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://exchanges.state.gov/heritage/culprop/cofact.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 19, 2012). This agreement covers both archaeological materials ranging in date from 1500 B.C. to
A.D. 1530 and ethnological materials ranging from A.D. 1530 to 1830.
8. See Italy, US. DEP'T OF STATE, http://exchanges.state.gov/heritage/culprop/itfact.html (last visited
Jan. 19, 2012). The metals category of the designated list was amended to include coins of Italian types
produced from the 9th century B.C. to 37 A.D. See Extension of Import Restrictions Imposed on Archaeo-
logical Material Originating in Italy, 76 Fed. Reg. 3012, 3013 (Jan. 19, 2011) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt.
12).
9. The agreement with Bolivia was extended on Dec. 2, 2011. See Bolivia, U.S. BUREAU OF EDUCA-
TIONAL AND CULTURAL AFEAIRS, http://exchanges.state.gov/heritage/culprop/blfact.htnl (last visited Feb.
13, 2012).
10. See Greece, U.S. DEP'r OF STATE, http://exchanges.state.gov/heritage/culprop/listactions/greece.html
(last visited Jan. 19, 2012); 76,231 Fed. Reg. 74691 (Dec. 1,2011). This agreement entered into force on Dec.
1, 2011. See id.
11. See Notice of Receipt of Cultural Property Request From the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria,
76 Fed. Reg. 63985 (Oct. 14, 2011); Notice of Receipt of Cultural Property Request From the Government
of the Republic of Belize, 76 Fed. Reg. 63985 (Oct. 14, 2011).
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C. ANCIENT CoiN COLLECTORS GUILD (ACCG) v. U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURrrY
Ancient coins became subject to import restriction for the first time when the Memo-
randum of Understanding (MOU) between Cyprus and the United States was extended
and amended in 200712 and were also included in the MOU between China and the
United States in January 2009.13 In 2009, the Ancient Coin Collectors Guild (ACCG), an
organization committed to promoting the free and independent collecting of ancient
coins, 14 initiated a test case of the application of import restrictions for ancient coins
originating from Cyprus and China. The ACCG, which had previously joined an unre-
lated suit against the Department of State under the Freedom of Information Act,15 ar-
ranged for the import in April 2009 through Baltimore, Maryland of unprovenanced
Cypriot and Chinese coin types that were subject to import restrictions. 16 The Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, which enforces the import restrictions, seized the coins in
July 2009.17 In February 2010, the ACCG filed a lawsuit against several federal agencies,
including the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State, challeng-
ing the validity of these import restrictions on several grounds.' 8 The District Court for
the District of Maryland dismissed the ACCG's complaint, 19 and the ACCG has appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.20
A central issue addressed by the district court was whether the exercise of presidential
authority that has been delegated to an administrative agency is subject to judicial review
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).21 In the CPIA, Congress granted the au-
thority to the President to enter into bilateral agreements under Article 9 of the 1970
UNESCO Convention once another State Party submits a request for an agreement 22 and
the President determines that four statutory criteria are satisfied. 23 Through a series of
transfers and delegations of authority, the Departments of State and Homeland Security
12. See Extension of Import Restrictions Imposed on Material From Cyprus, 72 Fed. Reg. 38470, 38471
(July 13, 2007) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 12).
13. See Import Restrictions Imposed on Certain Archaeological Material from China, 74 Fed. Reg. 2838,
2842 (Jan. 16, 2009) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 12).
14. See ACCG Home Page, http://www.accg.us.
15. SeeAncient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Dep't of State, 673 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2009) (granting
defendant's motion for summary judgment), affd. in part and rev'd. in part, 641 F.3d 505 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
16. See Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 801 F. Supp. 2d 383, 394 (D.C.
Md. 2011).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 395-96.
19. Id. at 418.
20. See Brief of Appellant, Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Customs and Border Prots., No. 11-2012
(4th Cir. Oct. 31, 2011).
21. The ACCG alleged that the actions of the State Department and Customs in including coins of Cyp-
riot and Chinese type on the respective designated lists were "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law," in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A). The ACCG also sought judicial review on several other bases, including "nonstatutory" or ultra
vires review, and under the court's "inherent equitable powers to remedy constitutional violations." Ancient
Coin, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 399-401.
22. Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a).
23. See id. § 2602(a)(1).
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now hold the President's authorities under the CPIA. 24 Once an agreement has been
negotiated and enters into force, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, promulgates a list of the archaeological or ethnological material of the
State Party that is subject to import restriction. 25 The materials may be listed by type or
other appropriate classification. 26 In Franklin v. Massachusetts,27 the Supreme Court held
that the President is not an "agency" within the meaning of the APA and that presidential
actions are therefore not reviewable under the APA, stating that "[olut of respect for the
separation of powers and the unique constitutional position of the President, . . . [w]e
would require an express statement by Congress before assuming it intended the Presi-
dent's performance of his statutory duties to be reviewed for abuse of discretion" under
the APA.28 The district court, following this precedent and decisions by other district
courts, held that agency actions taken pursuant to delegated presidential authority were
also not reviewable under the APA.29
The district court then considered whether the Department of State exceeded its statu-
tory authority under the CPIA by allegedly applying import restrictions to Cypriot or
Chinese coin types that were not known to be first discovered within the modern bounda-
ries of these respective nations.30 The court analyzed this assertion by stating that coins to
be imported could have a known find spot within Cyprus or China, a known find spot
outside of Cyprus or China, or no known find spot. While the parties agreed that the first
category would be subject to import restrictions and that coins in the second category
could not be restricted under an agreement with Cyprus or China, the question was
whether the State Department could regulate coins without a known find spot. The court
concluded:
LT]he State Department would not have exceeded its authority under the CPIA by
directing Customs to prohibit all coins of particular types, rather than only coins with
proven find spots in China or Cyprus .... [MInterpreting the "first discovered in"
requirement to preclude the State Department from barring the importation of
archaeological objects with unknown find spots would undermine the core purpose of
the CPIA, namely to deter looting of cultural property .... Looted objects are,
presumably, extremely unlikely to carry documentation, or at least accurate docu-
mentation, of when and where they were discovered and when they were exported
from the country in which they were discovered. Congress is therefore unlikely to
have intended to limit import restrictions to objects with a documented find spot.31
24. Ancient Coin, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 391.
25. 19 U.S.C. § 2604 (2010).
26. Id.
27. 505 U.S. 788 (1992).
28. Id. at 800-01.
29. Ancient Coin, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 402-04 (citing NRDC, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of State, 658 F. Supp. 2d 105,
109 (D.D.C. 2009); Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate v. U.S. Dep't of State, 659 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1082 (D.S.D.
2009); Tulare Cnty. v. Bush, 185 F. Supp. 2d 18, 28-29 (D.D.C. 2001); contra Sierra Club v. Clinton, 689 F.
Supp. 2d 1147, 1157 (D. Minn. 2010) (holding that the State Department's actions under delegated presiden-
tial authority in issuing a permit for a cross-border pipeline and accompanying environmental impact state-
ment were subject to APA review as agency actions).
30. On the invoice that accompanied the coins, the ACCG stated, for each, that the find spot was unknown.
Ancient Coin, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 400.
31. Id. at 409.
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Finally, the court rejected ACCG's claim that the State Department acted ultra vires
because China, in its request for an MOU, did not (ACCG alleges) specifically ask that
import restrictions be applied to coins by stating that it was not necessary for a requesting
nation to include a "detailed accounting of every item eventually covered by an Article 9
agreement." 32
II. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Litigation
A. ODYSSEY MARINE EXPLORAxION
On September 21, 2011, in Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v. Unidentified Shipwrecked
Vessel,33 the Eleventh Circuit held that a shipwreck of a sunken Spanish warship was im-
mune from arrest in U.S. court under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).34
The ship at issue-the Nuestra Senora de Las Mercedes y las Animas (the Mercedes)-sunk in
1804 off the coast of Spain following its explosion during the Battle of Cape Saint Mary
between Spain and Great Britain.35 The Mercedes was intercepted by British warships on
its return voyage from Peru.36 It had been to Peru to marshal finds from Peru, one of
Spain's Viceroyalties at the time, in order to meet certain monetary obligations to
France.37 At the time of its sinking, the ship was transporting approximately 900,000
silver pesos, 5,809 gold pesos, approximately 2,000 copper and tin ingots, and two bronze
cannons.
38
In 2007, a deep-ocean exploration and shipwreck recovery company, Odyssey Marine
Exploration, Inc., discovered the remains of the Mercedes, including 594,000 coins, and
brought certain of the recovered items to Florida. 39 It then filed an admiralty complaint
in rem and arrest warrant against the ship and its cargo, then titled an "Unidentified
Shipwrecked Vessel, its apparel, tackle, appurtenances and cargo." 4° Pursuant to the war-
rant, the U.S. Marshal took possession of certain recovered items to symbolically arrest
the ship, and the district court appointed Odyssey as the substitute custodian of the vessel
and its artifacts. 41
Spain, Peru, and twenty-five individuals thereafter filed claims against the ship and its
cargo. 42 Spain also filed a motion to dismiss the suit, arguing that the ship was a Spanish
Royal Navy Frigate immune from judicial arrest under section 1609 of the Foreign Sover-
32. Id. at 410. The court rejected a variety of other allegations, including that the State Department had
violated the Free Trade in Ideas Act and ACCG's constitutional rights and that Customs had violated the APA
in promulgating the designated list. Id. at 411-14.
33. Odyssey Marine Exploration v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, 657 F.3d 1159 (11 th Cir. 2011). For
previous discussion of this litigation, see Patty Gerstenblith & Lucille Roussin, Art and International Cultural
Property, 42 INT'L LAW. 729, 741 (2008).
34. Odyssey Marine Exploration, 657 F.3d at 1178. See also Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1602 etseq.
35. See Odyssey Marine Exploration, 657 F.3d at 1173.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1172.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1166.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1167.
42. Id. at 1166.
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eign Immunities Act,43 and accordingly, that the district court lacked subject-matter juris-
diction to adjudicate Odyssey's complaint.44 In support of Spain's motion, the United
States filed a Statement of Interest, arguing that the United States was obligated by the
1902 Treaty of Friendship and General Relations between the United States and Spain "to
afford sunken Spanish warships the same protections and immunities from implied aban-
donment and uncontested access and salvage as a sunken United States warship would
receive in United States courts." 45 The district court granted Spain's motion, and Odys-
sey-as well as Peru and the twenty-five individual claimants-appealed.46 On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 47
Among the many issues addressed, the Eleventh Circuit first determined whether the
res at issue was, in fact, Spain's property. Odyssey argued that the district court had "in-
sufficient evidence" to conclude that the ship was the Mercedes, but the Eleventh Circuit
found the factual record more than sufficient to conclude so.4 8 For example, the ship was
found off the coast of Spain in the zone plotted as "the likeliest area of the Mercedes'
demise," the scattered debris found at the site was consistent with a vessel that exploded
and then sank, a sampling of the coins recovered matched the types of coins known to
have been aboard on the Mercedes, and the cannons recovered matched the type the Merce-
des would have carried. 49
Having determined the ship was the Mercedes (a Spanish Navy warship and hence sover-
eign property) the court then analyzed whether section 1609 of the FSIA applied to pre-
vent its arrest. The Eleventh Circuit held that it did. s0 In so holding, the Eleventh
Circuit found, contrary to Odyssey's argument, that the Mercedes' physical location in in-
ternational waters did not defeat FSIA's applicability because the district court exercised
constructive possession of the ship when Odyssey deposited part of the wreck with the
court.51 The Eleventh Circuit also rejected Odyssey's arguments that a "commercial ac-
tivity" exception applied for several reasons, including that the Mercedes-a warship being
used as such at the time-was not engaged in commercial activity when it sank.
52
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's decision to vacate the ship's
arrest and order the return of the shipwreck and all recovered items to Spain.53 Releasing
the shipwreck to Spain, rather than to Odyssey, was consistent with the 1902 U.S.-Spain
Friendship Treaty, which requires the United States to afford protections from unautho-
43. Id. Section 1609 provides: "Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a
party at the time of enactment of this Act the property in the United States of a foreign state shall be immune
from attachment arrest and execution except as provided in sections 1610 and 1611 of this chapter." 28
U.S.C. § 1609.
44. Odyssey Marine Exploration, 657 F.3d at 1168.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1166.
48. Id. at 1171-74.
49. Id. at 1174.
50. Id. at 1175-79.
51. Id. at 1175.
52. Id. at 1176-78.
53. Id. at 1182-84.
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rized private party access to Spanish warships.54 Odyssey and others filed a petition for
rehearing en banc in October 2011.55
B. DE CSEPEL V. REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY
In 2010, heirs of Baron M6r Lip6t Herzog, a Jewish-Hungarian art collector who died
in 1934 with a collection of approximately 2,000 artworks, filed suit against Hungary and
several Hungarian state museums, seeking the return of Herzog's artworks allegedly ex-
propriated by Hungary and Nazi Germany during World War 11.56 In de Csepel v. Republic
of Hungary, decided September 1, 2011, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colum-
bia granted in part and denied in part Hungary's motion to dismiss.57
The district court held that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate the Herzog family claims
pursuant to the "expropriation exception" of the FSIA.58 That exception provides that a
foreign sovereign "shall not be immune" from the jurisdiction of a U.S. court in cases "in
which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue" and the prop-
erty is owned or operated by a foreign sovereign instrumentality, which is engaged in a
commercial activity in the United States.59 The defendants argued that the plaintiffs had
not alleged a taking in "violation of international law" because "a state's taking of the
property of its own citizens, no matter how egregious, does not constitute an international
law violation." 60 The district court disagreed, holding that Hungary did not consider the
Herzog heirs to be Hungarian citizens at the time of the seizures because Hungary had, de
facto, stripped all Hungarian Jews of their citizenship rights.61 Moreover, the court held
that the plaintiffs had alleged a sufficient commercial activity nexus with the United States
because the museums admitted to having in their possession Herzog Collection artworks,
they loaned art to U.S. museums, and encouraged and benefitted from U.S. tourism.
62
The district court did, however, grant defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims to
eleven specific artworks based on international comity.63 One of the Herzog heirs,
Martha Nierenberg, had sought to recover those same artworks in a lawsuit filed in Hun-
gary in 1999.64 The Hungarian courts had ordered the return of one of the artworks, but
54. Id. at 1183, citing Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 221 F.3d 634, 638 (4th
Cir. 2000), in which the court interpreted this treaty as requiring that "'Spanish vessels, like those belonging
to the United States, may only be abandoned by express acts."' Id. at 1174, n.8. The court also found
support in the Sunken Military Craft Act, 118 Stat. 1811 (2004), as negating application of the law of finds to
any foreign sunken military craft located in U.S. waters and denying salvage rights or awards with respect to
foreign sunken military craft located in U.S. waters without the express permission of the foreign state. Id.
55. As of November 2011, the Eleventh Circuit has not yet ruled on that petition.
56. de Csepel v. Republic of Hungaty, No. 10-1261(ESH), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98573, at *1-2 (D.D.C.
2011).
57. Id. at *3.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2008); de Csepel, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98573, at *24-39.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).
60. de Csepel, 2011 U.S. Dist. LFXIS 98573, at *27.
61. Id. at *30.
62. Id. at *34-39. The district court also rejected defendants' arguments that the suit had to be dismissed
based on, inter alia, a 1973 Agreement between the United States and Hungary, the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, the applicable statute of limitations, the act of state doctrine, and the political question doctrine.
Id. at *39-46, 53-72.
63. Id. at *72-76.
64 Id ar *17
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dismissed the suit as to the other pieces on the grounds of adverse possession. 65 The
Hungarian courts also ruled that Ms. Nierenberg's claims were barred by a 1973 Agree-
ment between Hungary and the United States pursuant to which the United States had
already awarded her compensation. 66 The de Csepel district court thus held that, under the
doctrine of international comity, the decision of the Hungarian courts would be given
effect in U.S. courts as to those eleven artworks. 67 The defendants have appealed the
district court's decision.
C. RUBIN LITIGATION
In 2011, important decisions were issued in the cases involving the Rubin plaintiffs and
the Islamic Republic of Iran. Both cases originated as a result of a September 4, 1997
suicide bombing in Israel that killed five persons and injured more than 200 others. 68 In
2001, some victims of the bombing and their family members filed suit against Iran and
Iranian governmental officials, claiming the defendants supported Hamas (which had
claimed responsibility for the bombing) with money and material support.69 Iran failed to
appear at trial and plaintiffs received a $71.5 million default judgment against the nation. 70
However, Plaintiffs enjoyed limited success in collecting on their judgment.7' Accord-
ingly, they filed several suits against U.S. institutions seeking to attach artifacts that
originated in Iran to satisfy their judgment.72
One case, against the University of Chicago's Oriental Institute and the Field Museum,
was on appeal this year to the Seventh Circuit.73 The district court had held that attach-
ment immunity afforded by Section 1609 of the FSIA was personal to Iran, which had to
appear and specially plead the immunity. 74 When Iran appeared and specially pled, the
district court did not address the immunity issue, but ordered the general-asset discovery
of all assets of Iran located in the United States.75
The FSIA has codified the common law rule that property of a foreign state located in
the United States is generally presumed to be immune from attachment and execution.
76
A plaintiff must overcome the presumption of immunity by identifying the particular
property owned by the foreign state and establishing that this property falls within a statu-
tory exception. 77 The immunity is inherent in the property and is not dependent on the
appearance and assertion of the immunity by the foreign state in the proceedings.78
65. Id. at *17-20.
66. Id. at *19-20.
67. Id. at *74-6.
68. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1109 (N.D. I1. 2004).
69. See id. at 1110.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See Patty Gerstenblith & Lucille Roussin, International Cultural Property, 41 INT'L LAW. 613, 624-26
(2007); Patty Gerstenblith et al., International Art and Cultural Heritage, 43 INT'L LAW. 811, 822-23 (2009).
73. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 637 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2011), rev'g. 436 F. Supp. 2d 938 (N.D. Ill.
2006), reh'g. and reb'g. denied en banc, (June 6, 2011).
74. Id. at 794.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 796.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 799.
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The Seventh Circuit determined initially that the FSIA protects foreign sovereigns
from judicial intrusion on their immunity in its various forms, and that interlocutory ap-
peal is appropriate relief regardless of which form of immunity is at issue. 79 Because the
district court had ordered general-asset discovery, it had in effect rejected Iran's claim of
attachment immunity under Section 1609 and the court therefore had jurisdiction to re-
view it under the collateral-order doctrine.80 Iran's timely appeal of that general-asset
discovery order brought up the district court's previous order that denied Section 1609
attachment in the absence of an appearance by Iran.8 1
The court held that, under Section 1609, property owned by a foreign state in the
United States is presumed immune from attachment and execution.8 2 The party in pos-
session of the property may raise the immunity, or the court may do so sua sponte; in
either case, the court must satisfy itself independently that an exception to Section 1609
immunity applies before it orders attachment or other execution on property owned by a
foreign state that is located in the United States.8 3 The Seventh Circuit thus reversed the
district court's general-asset discovery order and its previous order that required Iran to
appear and specially plead Section 1609 immunity and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings.84 The plaintiffs have filed a petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.
In the second case, the Rubin plaintiffs had moved to attach by trustee process certain
objects, which plaintiffs alleged were the property of Iran, in possession of Harvard Uni-
versity and the Boston Museum of Fine Arts.85 Defendants responded denying that the
objects were the property of Iran and moved to dissolve the attachments.8 6 The court had
previously ruled that the objects sought by plaintiffs were immune from execution and
attachment under the FSLA, but that Plaintiffs may be able to attach them pursuant to
Section 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA).87 Section 201(a) of the TRIA
provides that where a judgment is obtained against a terrorist party for a claim based on an
act of terrorism, the blocked assets of that party are subject to execution or attachment to
satisfy the judgment.88
While TRIA provides no mechanism for this execution or attachment, Rule 69 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that parties can resort to state-level procedures
and remedies.89 Plaintiffs had invoked Massachusetts' procedures with their motion, and
under the relevant Massachusetts law, plaintiffs had the burden to show that the trustees
had property owned by Iran in their possession. 90 The court determined that plaintiffs did
not meet that burden. 91
79. Id. at 790.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 792.
82. Id. at 801.
83. Id.
84. Id.






91. Id. at *2.
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The court was not persuaded by Plaintiffs' argument that Iranian law automatically
vested ownership of excavated antiquities in the Iranian government. 92 The court found
that "plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that antiquities that originated from the terri-
tory that is now Iran are the property of the judgment debtor Iran."93 The court, there-
fore, denied plaintiffs' motion for order of attachment and granted defendants' motions to
dissolve attachments. 94
D. ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE: KONOWALOFF V. THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF
ART
The Metropolitan Museum of Art prevailed in a motion to dismiss on the grounds that
a suit brought to recover a Paul C~zanne painting, entitled Madame Cizanne in the Con-
servatory, or Portrait of Madame Cezanne, was barred by the act of state doctrine. 95 The
suit was brought by Pierre Konowaloff, great-grandson and sole heir of Ivan Morozov,
who owned the painting until 1918 when it was seized by Russia's former Bolshevik re-
gime.96 The Bolsheviks took power in Russia in 1917, and pursuant to one of a number of
decrees issued by the regime to nationalize private property, Morozov's art collection was
deemed state property, and his home was declared a "Second Museum of Western Art"
where confiscated art was stored and shown to mostly foreign buyers. 97 In 1933, the same
year the United States officially recognized the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Repub-
lic (RSFSR), which had been established by the Bolsheviks, the painting was purchased in
secret by Stephen C. Clark, who is credited with helping to open the Museum of Modem
Art (MOMA) and, at that time, was a trustee of the Metropolitan Museum of Art.98 In
1960, Clark bequeathed the painting to the Metropolitan Museum, where it has been
displayed since. 99
The court granted the Museum's motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) after concluding that the act of state doctrine precluded it from ques-
tioning the Soviet state's act of confiscating the painting from Morozov. 100 Konowaloff
attempted to distinguish the act as one of a political party, rather than of the state, noting
that the sale of the painting to Clark had been authorized by the Politburo, an executive
arm of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), which was distinct from the
Soviet state.' 01 The court disagreed with this argument, however, concluding that the act
at issue was not the sale of the painting to Clark, but rather the painting's expropriation
from Morozov, which had taken place pursuant to a governmental decree. 10 2 The court
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at '3.




98. Id. at *2.
99. Id. at *3.
100. Id. at *8.
101. Id. at *2-3 (noting that private trade was, at that time, a crime under Soviet law).
102. Id. at *5 (citing id. at *6 ("longstanding precedent recognizing the Soviet government as the state and its
activities as legitimate, official acts")).
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also dismissed Konowaloff's argument that the seizure of the painting was for "no legiti-
mate governmental purpose," concluding that any inquiry into the legitimacy or illegiti-
macy of an official state act is specifically prohibited by the act of state doctrine. 03
Continuing to dismiss each of Konowaloff's attempts to defeat the act of state doctrine,
the court also noted that whether the acting regime is still in existence is not dispositive; it
is only one of several factors when deciding to invoke the act of state doctrine. 104 Courts
have refused to apply the act of state doctrine based on a change in government when the
previous government has either since been rejected by a community of nations or where
the subsequent government has repudiated the acts of that former regime.' 05 However,
the court concluded that Konowaloff's attempts to characterize certain acts of the current
Russian Federation as repudiating the acts of the former Soviet government were unsuc-
cessful, as those recent acts addressed only past sales of Russian art and affirmed that the
current Russian government does not pursue a policy of nationalization, but did not pass
on past acts of nationalization of private property. 06
The court also referred to the Sabbatino decision in dismissing Konowaloff's argument:
the taking of the painting violated international law by noting that the act of state doctrine
is applicable even when international law has been violated. 07 Ultimately, each of Ko-
nowaloff's attempts to defeat application of the doctrine fell short, and the Museum's
motion to dismiss was granted.
M. Legal Developments Concerning Art Works Looted during the
Holocaust: Bakalar v. Vavra
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York was given another op-
portunity to rule on the dispute involving tide to an Egon Schiele drawing, Seated Woman
with Bent Left Leg (Torso), dated to 1917, which was part of the artwork collection of Franz
Friedrich Grunbaum, who was a Viennese cabaret performer prior to World -Var 1I. 108
After his arrest by Nazis and imprisonment in Dachau, but prior to his death in 1941,
Grunbaum executed a power of attorney in favor of his wife. The drawing was later sold
to Galerie Gutekunst, a Swiss art gallery, in 1956 by Grunbaum's sister-in-law, Mathilde
Lukacs. That same year the drawing was sold to the Galerie St. Etienne in New York,
from whom Bakalar bought the drawing in 1963. Bakalar consigned the drawing to
Sotheby's for sale in 2004, which subsequently froze the sale when Vavra and Fischer,
Grunbaum's heirs, challenged Bakalar's tide.
After a bench trial in 2008, the district court applied Swiss law to the issue of whether
Bakalar had acquired title to the drawing, and decided in favor of Bakalar. Last year,
103. Id. at *6.
104. Id. at *6, 8.
105. Id. at *7 (citing the D.C. Circuit's recent decision in Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States v.
Russian Fed., 528 F.3d 934, 954 (D.C. Cir. 2008), in which the court indicated that the flexibility established
in Sabbatino may be inappropriate where it would invite a court to engage in "political evaluation of the
character of regime change itself").
106. Id. at *7.
107. Id. at *8 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 431 (1964)).
108. Bakalar v. Vavra, No. 05 Civ. 3037(WHP), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91851, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17,
2011).
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however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated that decision and
remanded for consideration of the issue of title under New York law. 109 Noting that "[i]n
New York, a thief cannot pass good title," the question of whether the drawing had been
stolen-a question the District Court had deemed irrelevant under Swiss law-became
the crucial issue on remand, with the burden falling on Bakalar to prove that a theft had
not occurred. " 0
The court concluded that the most reasonable inference from the record was that the
drawing had not been appropriated by the Nazis after Grunbaum's arrest. It then ad-
dressed and dismissed each of the theories as to how Lukacs acquired the drawing in a
manner that permitted her to convey tide to Galerie Gutekunst."'
First, the court found that Bakalar failed to prove the drawing had passed to Lukacs
through an inter vivos gift. The court held that, where the proponent has the burden of
proving the elements of an inter vivos gift by clear and convincing evidence, mere posses-
sion by a family member is insufficient to establish the required donative intent., 2 Next,
unable to prove that Lukacs acquired the drawing through a sale, Bakalar also failed to
show that Lukacs had acquired "voidable" title under the New York Uniform Commercial
Code, which would have entitled her to transfer good tide to a good faith purchaser for
value.13 Reasserting its conclusion that Lukacs's mere possession of the drawing after
Grunbaum's death created a reasonable assumption that the Nazis had not appropriated
the drawing, the court also refused to infer that the power of attorney executed by
Grunbaum had been the product of duress, which Defendants argued would have voided
any subsequent transfer of the property." 4 The court also found no evidence that the
drawing had been transferred to Lukacs pursuant to that power of attorney, even assuming
it had been void as a product of duress. Finally, the court dismissed the possibility that
Lukacs had acquired sufficient tide to the drawing through intestacy as an heir to
Grunbaum's estate, finding the same outcome under both Austrian and New York intes-
tacy laws. 5
Although Bakalar was unable to prove that good title had passed to Lukacs, the court
ultimately ruled in his favor, holding that the defendants' claim was barred by the equita-
ble defense of laches. 116 Relying largely on the defendants' own testimony, the court con-
cluded that both Vavra's and Fischer's ancestors knew, or should have known, that they
had at least a potential intestate right to Grunbaum's property, and imputed this knowl-
109. Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 147 (2d Cir. 2010).
110. Id. at 140, 147.
111. Bakalar, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91851, at "13-25.
112. Id. at *14-15.
113. Id. at "16. See N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (McKinney 2001), where the concept of "voidable tide" applies
only to "sales," defined in N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (McKinney 2001) as the "passing of title from the seller to
the buyer for a price."
114. Id. at "11, 18 (noting that this theory had first been suggested by Judge Korman in his concurring
opinion for the Second Circuit).
115. Id. at "20-25 (concluding that, under Austrian law, in order for an heir to take possession of inheritance,
a court must have issued a decree of distribution, which had not occurred prior to Lukacs's sale of the draw-
ing, and, under New York law, legal tide does not pass to an heir until the administration of an estate is
complete, which also had not occurred prior to the sale of the drawing by Lukacs).
116. Id. at "13.
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edge to Vavra and Fischer themselves." 7 Significantly, the court admitted, "as to Vavra
and Fischer personally, the applicability of laches is doubtful given that Vavra only became
an heir to Grunbaum's estate in 1994, and Fischer only became aware of the existence of
Grunbaum's estate in 1999."118 Finding no evidence that the defendants' ancestors had
made sufficient efforts to recover that property, the court concluded that the delay in
bringing this action significantly prejudiced Bakalar's ability to gather evidence necessary
to vindicate his rights."19 In particular, the court noted its inability to rule on the issue of
whether, due to a lack of available evidence, Lukacs had sufficient tide to the drawing
prior to the sale to the Galerie Gutekunst. 120
Finally, identifying Bakalar as "an ordinary non-merchant," the court refused to impose
upon him any duty to investigate the provenance of the drawing or infer such duty from
his prior efforts to keep his possession of the drawing confidential that Bakalar had "un-
clean hands." 121 Thus, although the Second Circuit's remand indicated the determination
of whether the drawing had been stolen would be dispositive, it was an expansive applica-
tion of laches that concluded this dispute over Grunbaum's drawing.
IV. Civil Forfeiture: United States v. The Painting Known as "Le Marche"
In 2006, the U.S. government had moved to forfeit a monotype, Le Marchi, by the
French Impressionist painter Camille Pissarro, which, along with a second painting, was
stolen from the Mus~e Faure in Aix-les-Bains, France, in 1981.122 Soon after the theft,
the painting was consigned to a gallery in San Antonio, Texas, and then sold to the Sharan
Corporation in 1985.123 The Sharan Corporation became defunct in 1992, and Sharyl
Davis, a partial owner of Sharan, took possession of the painting.124 About ten years later,
Davis consigned the painting to Sotheby's for sale.' 25 When French authorities became
aware of the impending sale, they contacted U.S. law enforcement, and, at the request of
the Department of Homeland Security, Sotheby's withdrew the painting from sale. The
United States moved to forfeit the painting on three grounds-the first was premised on a
117. Id. at *30-33 (setting forth the efforts, or lack of efforts, of Defendants' ancestors in attempting to
recover Grunbaun's property, and applying its prior decision in Sanchez v. Trustees of the Univ. of Penn.,
2005 WL 94847 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), where the lack of efforts made by the plaintiff's father and grandfather,
from whom the property at issue had been stolen, were determinative).
118. U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91851, at *34.
119. Id. at *35.
120. Id. at *36 ("Of the greatest significance is the death of Mathilde Lukacs in 1979, perhaps the only
person who could have elucidated the manner in which she came to possess the drawing, or indeed, whether
she owned it at all.").
121. Id. at *37-38.
122. United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 2011), affg. United States v. Painting known as "Le
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Customs violation126 and the other two were premised on a violation of the Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA).127
Under the burden-shifting analysis used in civil forfeiture cases, the government has the
initial burden to demonstrate probable cause that the monotype was subject to forfei-
ture.128 Once the government meets this burden, the burden then shifts to the claimant to
refute the government's case by a preponderance of the evidence. 29 The United States
met its burden based on the eyewitness identification of Guelton by a museum guard who
saw the thief, thus establishing that the monotype was stolen, and that someone who knew
it was stolen property had transported it across international boundaries. The district
court therefore held that the painting was forfeitable under the Customs statute, based on
the United States' argument that Guelton was the thief who stole the painting from the
museum in France and who brought the painting into the United States.
On appeal, Davis argued, first, that the underlying law in the "contrary to law" provi-
sion of Section 1595a(c) had to be another Customs law, rather than a non-Customs stat-
ute, such as the National Stolen Property Act.' 30 The Second Circuit rejected this
argument on the grounds that the statute should be read literally and contained no restric-
tion as to the underlying law. Davis then argued that the two safeguards introduced by
CAFRA should apply to this forfeiture: one is the innocent owner defense,' 3 ' and the
second is a more claimant-friendly, burden-shifting rubric. 132 The Second Circuit re-
jected both of these defenses on the grounds that CAFRA explicitly does not apply to civil
forfeitures under any provision of the Customs statute under Title 19.133
126. Id. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1595a(c)(1)(A) (West 2010) (The Customs statute authorizes forfeiture of
"[mlerchandise which is introduced ... into the United States contrary to law... if [the merchandise] ... is
stolen .... "); see also 18 U.S.C.A §§ 2314-15 (West 2010) (The National Stolen Property Act prohibits, inter
alia, possession or sale of stolen goods valued at $5000 or more that have moved across state or international
boundaries, with knowledge that the goods were stolen).
127. Under CAFRA, 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(c) (2006), property "derived from proceeds traceable to a viola-
tion of.. . any offense constituting 'specified unlawful activity'" is forfeitable to the United States. Violations
of the National Stolen Property Act are "specified unlawful activity." See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(c).
128. 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (2000).
129. Davis, 648 F.3d at 88. This burden-shifting analysis is outlined in 19 U.S.C. § 1615.
130. Id. at 89.
131. 18 U.S.C.A. § 983(d)(1) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011).
132. See id. § 983(c) (government has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
property is subject to forfeiture).
133. Davis, 648 F.3d at 95; 18 U.S.C.A. § 983(i)(2)(A) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011) (referring to the "Customs
carve-out," excluding from the definition of "civil forfeiture statute" any provision under the Tariff Act of
1930 and Title 19).
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